I. INTRODUCTION
-CRIME is on the rise. Estimates for the cost of E worm and virus epidemics, and Distributed Denial of Service @DOS) attacks are often on the order of several billions of dollars. Even if the m e cost is one order of magnitude smaller, we would still need to address these problems, especially since the frequency and severity of these attacks are increasing. One of the most severe DDoS attacks, against the Domain Name System (DNS) in January 2003, proves that even the critical infrastructure of the Intemet is potentially vulnerable. More recently, attackers target victims for political or economic reasons-KO, RIAA, and anti-spam blacklist servers have all been the subject of such attacks. Lastly, attacks are sometimes used to extort money from their victims. Attackers request "protection" money to stop the attack or guarantee that it will not be repeated. Twenty UK betting sites, the e-commerce f i r m "2Checkout", and e-book distributors were all recent victims of attacks that occurred in conjunction with extortion attempts. Many attacks, including large scale DDoS attacks, use spoofed source IP addresses to protect the perpetrators or their assets.
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Unfortunately, the current Internet infrastructure does not provide mechanisms for e-crime victims to defend themselves against attackers who use IP spoofing. Law enforcement could greatly benefit from IP traceback methods, particularly in the cases involving extortion. Finally, traceback mechanisms are a first step in providing automated packet filtering at routers in order to block an attack's origin.
To effectively provide the above benefits and be applicable in an Internet environment, a traceback mechanism must have the following general properties:
IncDep: A traceback mechanism should function even when only partially dcployed across routers in the Internet.
RtrChg: A traceback mechanism should only require a small hardware change on routers.
FewPkt: A traceback mechanism should allow the victim to identify the attack path after only a small number of packets.
Scale: A traceback mechanism should scale to a large number of attackers while maintaining accuracy (as measured by, incorrect implication of non-attacking endhosts and routers (false positives), and the failure to identify true attack endhosts and routers (false negatives)).
Local: A traceback mechanism should allow an attack victim to perform traceback locaIIy, without communicating with any router or ISl? Table I shows that none of the major traceback mechanisms provides all of the above properties, besides Fast Internet Traceback (FlT) . A detailed discussion of prior traceback proposals is in Section 11. Contributions In this paper, we propose FIT, a new probabilistic packet-marking approach for IP traceback that achieves much stronger properties than previous schemes. We list a summary of the contributions of this paper : The FIT traceback scheme is very efficient. In contrast to previous work, FIT simultaneously achieves all the following properties: tens of packets to trace an attack path, scales to thousands of distributed attackers, incrementally deployable, and no per-flow or per-packet stare required at routers. FIT provides the unique property that the victim can detect the presence of legacy routers on the attack path. Previous traceback mechanisms either fail completely when large numbers of legacy routers are present, or misrepresent reconstructed router Iocations along the path by counting only traceback enabled routers in their distance measurement. FIT 
B. Requirements fur IP Traceback riiechanisms and Analvsis of Previous Approaches
We now discuss the properties of an ideal uaceback mechanism, and argue why previously proposed mechanisms do not achieve them.
To be viable for forensics and DDoS defense, a traceback approach needs to provide incremental benefits even when deployed on a small number of routers, should require only a small hardware change and minor computation overhead on the router, should require only a few packets to traceback to an attacker, should scale to large DDoS attacks with few false positive and false negatives, requires a small overhead on the victim for traceback, and enables the victim to perform traceback locally without relying on the communication infrastructure that is under attack.
We now discuss these properties in more detail and describe how previous traceback approaches achieve them. Table I Since we have n attackers, the total number of packets received is 5n2/p2.' FIT is presented here with a baseline reconstruction scheme which scales to thousands of attackers. In Section V we present preliminary techniques to further improve FIT'S scalability.
Low overhead for attack path reconstruction. The reconstruction of the attack path should be efficient for the victim. The algebraic traceback scheme requires O ( v~2 .~) computations for reconstruction (where m is the number of fragments collected) [53. The approach by Burch and Cheswick would require substantial network resources to send the additional packets for highbandwidth network links [3] , which does not satisfy our requirement for low overhead on the victim. Similarly, the approach by Li et al. has a high bandwidth overhead for the victim, as the victim needs to send about 1-10 'These are estimates based on formulas io their paper [5] , however, they do not provide experiments or simulation results for real attack path reconstruction.
Mbytes of information to each router on the attack path for tracehack [121. Local. Other shortcomings. In a pollution attack, the attacker sends malicious fragments that interfere with path reconstruction [IO] . Since the traceback approach by Goodrich does not use a distance field, it is susceptible to a pollution attack, because the victim cannot distinguish between fragments generated by an attacker and those generated by marking routers. For example, if our marking probability is q = 0.04, the probability that packets arrive unmarked by an attacker at distance 12 hops is (1 -q)'2 = 0.96l2 = 0.61. Thus, almost two out of three markings created by the attacker arrive at the victim, which can prevent successful reconstruction.
With 100% deployment, other traceback schemes are less susceptible to pollution attacks hecause their distance fields allow marking injection only at distances greater than the closest attacker. However, large numbers of legacy routers reduce this immunity because distance is only counted in terms of marking-enabled routers. FIT has an arguably stronger resistance to pollution attacks, even under partial deployment, because it counts distance in terms of legacy and marking-enabled routers under most circumstances. Figure 1 shows the notation we use in this paper. In this section, we first present an overview of FIT, then we describe in detail how packet marking works, and how we can calculate the marking distance based on a single additional distance bit, followed by a detailed discussion on how FIT map and path reconstruction work.
FIT: FAST INTERNET TRACEBACK

A. FIT Overview
The FIT traceback mechanism is in the family of PPM (Probabilistic Packet Marking) traceback schemes [15], and consists of two major parts: a packet marking scheme to be deployed at routers, and map and path reconsmction algorithms used by endhosts receiving the packet markings.
In FIT, an attack victim is assumed to have constructed a map of upstream routers and their Ip addresses using packet markings received before the attack itself occurs fragment of the hash of the marking router's IF address, the number of the hash fragment marked in the packet, and a distance field. Based on the distance field and the TTL of a given packet, the attack victim can determine from how many hops away the marking is generated. The victim uses the hash fragments and distance calculation from the markings in the malicious packets in conjunction with its router map to identify a candidate set of marking routers, After a number of difEerent hash fragments matching a particular router arrive at the victim, that router is added to the reconstructed attack path.
Although FIT is superficially similar to the AMS traceback scheme (both use upstream router maps and packet markings with the fragment/number/distance format) FIT employs novel marking and reconstruction algorithms which dramatically improve its performance and make it a more viable traceback mechanism.
First, FIT allows the attack victim to generate the upstream router map using packet markings rather than the traceroute tool used in AMS. Traceroute generated maps have two serious deficiencies: they are inaccurate in the presence of asymmetric paths,3 and they cause increased false positives because they do not distinguish between legacy and marking-enabled routers (as we discuss in Section 11-B).
Second, the FIT marking mechanism uses node sampling instead of the commonly used edge sampling [SI, [ 151, I1 71 , greatly reducing the number of false positives and the number of packets required for stack path reconstruction.
3Traceroute returns the path of packets from the victim to potential attackers, which may be different from the path of packets from potential attackers to the victim.
Third, FIT uses only 1-bit in the IP ID field to mark the distance from the victim at which the packet was marked. This allows 4 extra bits (previous traceback schemes used a 5 bit field} to be used for hash fragment marks, which both greatly reduces false positives (allowing FIT to scale to greater numbers of attackers} and increases the effective marking probability (we explain this in Section 111-C) allowing FIT to traceback using fewer packets. In the following sections, we describe FIT in detail, b
B. Packet Marking
In the FIT scheme, as in all other PPM schemes, routers mark (overwrite) the 16 bit IP Identification (IP ID) field of the IPv4 header of a small percentage of the packets that they forward. A FIT router marks a forwarded packet with a certain probability, q, which is a global constant among all FIT enabled routers (set to 0.04 in our experiments4). A packet mark is divided into three fields, as shown in Figure 2 . The first field, denoted as b, is the I-bit distance field. The second and third fields involve the router's hash.
Each FIT router pre-calculates a hash of its IP address and splits the hash into n fragments of bjrag-bits each, where n is a global constant. The size of each fragment, bfrag, is set as 15 -bf,,,.5 When marking a packet, a router randomly selects a fragment number to mark into the frag# field, and marks the corresponding fragment's bits into the hash fragment field.
frag# hash fragment
Unlike other PPM schemes, FIT has a deterministic marking aspect. For each packet that a particular FIT router has not probabilistically marked, that same router calculates a marking predicate based on the packet's TTL field and distance bit. The marking predicure contains a calculation of the minimum bound on the distance, in FIT-enabled and legacy router hops, since the packet was last marked. If the packet was not marked for the past 32 4The marking probability q is chosen as 1. for optimizing the probability of receiving markings from routers 2 hops away from the packet receiver [15] . q = 0.04 is optimal for markings from routers at a distance of 25 hops from the reconstructing endhost.
5Tlie minimum required length of tbe hash is 2bfpuLm (15-b f n u m ) bits. Hash functions with shorter outputs can be used by concatenating a counter value to the input. evaluating the hash function once for each counter value. and concatenating the outputs (similar to the SSLRLS protocol 161.) hops then the niarking predicate evaluates to true and the packet is automaticatly maked by the forwarding router. The marking predicate is evaluated as:
mod 64 > 32, where blc denotes the concatenation of the distance bit b in the packet with the global constant c, and T T L p , o~ denotes the six least significant bits of the TTL field. We discuss the rationale for this in more detail in Section 111-C.
When marking a packet a router randomly selects a fragment number to write into the f m g # field and marks the hash fragment field with the corresponding hash fragment's bits. The router also sets the 5 leastsignificant bits of the packet's TTL to a global constant c, and stores the 6th bit of the TTL in the distance field b. This last step allows the next FIT-enabled router, or the packet receiver, to determine the distance since the router's mark. We explain the details of calculating the distance as well as the ramifications of modifying a packet's TTL in-flight in the following section. Finally, if a router does not mark the packet then it will not change any part of the IP ID field. I) means that we select a number from the interval 10, I ) uniformly at random. sends false markings designed to misdirect the traceback, the zerohncrement mechanism also has some drawbacks, First, the mechanism requires 5 bits of space to be able to identify distances commonly seen in Jnternet paths. Second, distance is counted as traceback enabled router hops since only traceback enabled routers modify the distance field. This causes an increase in false positives when large numbers of legacy routers are present. The FIT distance mechanism maintains all the properties of the zerohncrement distance scheme while addressing these two issues.
2 ) Calculating Distance in F I T : Recall the distancerelated operations a marking router performs in FIT: it sets the 5 least-significant bits of the packet's TTL field to a global constant c, and stores the sixth bit of the TIL in the distance field b. When a packet arrives at its destination, the distance at which the packet was marked is computed as: 
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Lime. This occurs when the TTL is in the invalid range (bJ~-TTL1~,,~,)7)10$64 > 32 (thus triggering the marking predicate), or wiIl become invalid at some point along the path, regardless of whether b = 0 or 1. Figure 4 shows the probability that a packet remains unmarked given the initial TTL, for our chosen TTL replacement constant c = 22. The figure depicts the intuitive result that nearly half of the TTLs on a path of length 15 result in unconditionally marked packets; with longer paths having more and shorter paths having fewer such TTLs. Probability that packet is unmarked given an initial TTL
D. Map Reconsmiction
FIT needs the map of upstream routers for traceback. In this section, we describe how the victim can generate this upstream router map.
From Section 111-B, every packet mark consists of a Lp address hash fragment, a fragment number, and a distance bit. FIT map reconstruction leverages the fact that an endhost can group together packets that traverse the same path during a TCP connection. When receiving packet markings from the same distance and TCP connection, an endhost can assume.that the markings come from the same router. Thus, the endhost collects nmap unique fragments from a particular distance, scans through the space of all possible IP addresses, and adds the IP address whose hash matches the nmap fragments to the upstream router map.'
Map Reconstruction Accuracy
Two performance metrics in Map Reconstruction require analysis: the expected number of false positives, and the number of packets required to reconstruct the T P addresses of all routers. First, we consider the number of false positives that the map reconstruction algorithm will produce, A 'Map reconstruction can be performed offline and in paraLlol such that only one pass over the IP address space is necessary to reconstruct all routers for which the endhost has stored T E , ,~ markings. A modern workstation can calculate the SHA-1 bash of all 232 IP addresses in approximately half an hour. ' false positive will occur when two IP addresses share a common subset of hash fragments which are received by the reconstructing endhost. The endhost will not be able to differentiate between the two IPS and will thus add both of them to the reconstructed map. If we have 'n distinct fragments and we need at least nmP fragments to reconstruct the IP address, the expected number of false positive routers reconstructed is:
The expected number of false positive IP addresses per router to be reconstructed fp, is independent of the number of IPS in the reconstructed map. To reconstruct an IP address, an endhost must receive nmap distinct hash fragments from the router with that IP address (as discussed above, nmp is selected to minimize the number of false positive routers). The probability of receiving j drstinct hash fragments from a set of k total fragments after receiving y randomly selected fragments is [7] :
To receive a fragment from a router at distance i , that router must mark a packet and all subsequent routers must not mark that packet. Thus, the probability of receiving "Since packets can carry only a single marking, the reconstruction probabilities are clearly not independent, but assuming independence gives us a pessimistic estimate on the number of packets required. a packet with a frasment from a router at distance i hops from the victim, given marking probability q , is: 
E. Path Reconstruction
The purpose of an IF' Traceback mechanism is to reconstruct the I P addresses of the routers on the path from the attacker to the victim, We assume that the victim has completed the map reconstruction phase that we outline in the previous section (i.e., generated the map of upstream routers). Similar to all previous Ip Traceback mechanisms, we m u m e that the victim has a mechanism to identify malicious packets, so that it can perform traceback.
In the path reconstruction phase, the victim uses its router map and marked attack packets to reconstruct the attack path, which is the set of all routers that forwarded attack packets. In Section III-C we describe that the victim can detect how many routers the packet traversed since it was marked, using the one bit distance field b, the last six bits of the TTL, and the five bit TTL replacement constant c:
m.od G4. The fragment identifier is used to identify which subset of the hash was marked in a particular packet.
3ased on these values, the victim can identify candidate attack path routers crfter receiving only c( single rriarked packet as follows. The victim compares the hash fragment it receives with the hash fragments of all routers at the distance d in its router map, and marks any router with a matching fragment. If we have Td routers at distance cl, the bfras bit hash fragment will match the marking router, as well as rd/2'f7-false positive routers. More concretely, if we instantiate FIT with four distinct fragments (bf,,, = a), we have 13 bits for the hash fragment (bfrag = 13); a marking from distance 8 in our map will match approximately rd/213 = 10: 000/213 = 1.2 false positive routers (Figure 6 shows the number of unique routers vs. distance from 'data gathered by the skitter project.). In the case that the victim's map contains a unique path from the reconstructed router to the victim, the victim can knows that the router, and al1 its downstream routers, are on the attack path as well.
FIT provides a significant benefit over AMS due to the fact that AMS performs link marking (i.e., each marking composed of the XOR of the hash fragments of two adjacent routers) requiring incremental (by distance) path reconstruction, In contrast, FIT path reconstruction can identify a router far away from the victim before identifying all the routers downstream from it. In some cases, FIT can even perform a rough single packet traceback. Consider the case where an attacker 15 hops away from the victim sends a singIe malicious packet.
With probability q, the router at distance 14 (assuming that it is a FIT-enabled router), will mark the packet; and the victim will receive that marking with probability (1 -q) 13. In our Internet map, we have approximately 215 routers at distance 14, and in case we use a bj,,, = 2 bit field, the hash fragment size is bfrag = 13 bits, we will certainly reconstruct the correct router at distance 14, dong with P5/2l3 = 4 false positive routers.
We now analyze the use of multiple fragments to lower the false positive rate in both single and multiple attacker traceback. In the Internet map we use in our experiments, we have about 40,000 routers at distances 11 and 12. Assuming that our hash fragment field is 13 bits long (bfrag = 131, we will still receive 40,000/213 = 4.9 false positive routers per marking, and for bfras = 12, we will receive 40,000/212 = 9.8 false positives. To lower the false positive rate, we can require multiple markings per router. We denote the number of distinct fragments needed to reconstruct an IP address of a router as npath. Requiring multiple fragments drastically reduces the number of false positives, in the case of a single attacker we have ~-, / ( 2~f~-g .~p~~~) false positives. For bfras = 13 and = 2, the number of false positive routers at distance 11 is 40: 000/22G = 6 I lop4. However, the number of false positives increases if we have multiple attackers. If we have ?+do routers on the attack path at distance d, the false positive markings for each router on the attack path will reinforce each other, We now compute the number of false positive routers at distance d, assuming that the victim received all fragments from all 7'da routers that forward attack traffic at distance d." The probability that a specific fragment of a router not on the attack matches that fragment of a router on the attack path is: / Since we require at least npath markings per router to add it to the attack path, the probability that a router will be a false positive is
The number of false positive routers at distance d then is Pf (Td -Tda) *
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we complement the mathematical analysis of FIT from Section I11 with experimental results using representative Internet topologies, such as those provided by CADA's Skitter map [4] . Our experiments are divided into two sections: map reconstruction and path reconstruction.
A. Map Reconsrrucrion
The map reconstruction experiment is as follows: every host in the entire Skitter map sends x packets to the victim (the f-root Skitter map we use has 174409 hosts).
Endhosts randomize both the initial TTL and I P II> field of each of their packets. As we discuss in Section In-D, during map reconstruction the reconstructing endhost is capable of grouping together packets from the same sender by groupign packets by TCP connection.
We are interested in the accuracy (i.e., false positives vs. false negatives) as well as the speed (in terms of number of packets required from each host) in which reconstruction of the IP addresses of the routers upstream from the victim can occur. Because we are dealing with map-rather than attack path-reconstruction, a router is counted as a false positive if it is added to the reconstructed map but is not actually on any of the paths leading to the victim. Likewise, all routers not '*Assuming that all fragments of a router on the attack path are received is quite pessimistic in tbs analysis, in practice we expect h a t a victim would receive a smaller number of fragments fmm each router which would result in a smaller number of false positives.
reconstructed by the victim but present on the paths in the topology are counted as false negatives.
We assume that the victim has no knowledge of the Internet ~opology. This means that the victim will not combine fragments collected from different paths in order to reconstruct routers common to both paths. However, false negatives are computed per-distance, so a reconstructed router in one path will count in all the paths in which it appears at the same distance from the victim. This result is already scaled to a large number of paths (1744091, and it is likely that larger numbers of paths will increase the performance due to increased router overlap between paths. Finally, as predicted in the mathematical analysis of Section 111-D, the 8/4 scheme performs an order of magnitude bettcr in false positives than the 413 scheme due to the greater number of hash bits available to it. However, both schemes perform very well in this regard, with neither scheme producing more than 0.3% I3Schemes are expressed as n/nmap; the total number of unique fragments, n, out of which the victim must collect nmap fragments to reconstruct the IP address.
Hops from victim 
B. Pa lh Reconstruction
Path reconstruction is the most critical performance aspect of a traceback scheme. As in map reconstruction, performance is measured in terms of false negatives, false positives, and the number of packets required from each sender. However, in path reconstruction, a host cannot correlate separate fragments since an attacker is assumed to be spoofing the IP address of each attack packet, thus preventing the victim from grouping packets together. The result is an increase in the number of false positives, as fragments from separate routers are incorrectly combined together to implicate a third router.
In examining the IP address distribution of the Skitter map in Figure 6 , we see that even a 13-bit hash fragment (the largest size for b b h that will still allow for map reconstruction) from distance 10 will be shared by an average of approximately 5 routers. The solution is to require that multiple fragments match before a router is added to the attack path. However this allows for the possibility that two unrelated fragments cause a false positive because of the victim's inability to group them correctly.
The path reconstruction experiment is geared to show the effect of varying the number of fragments required to add a router to the attack path (changing npth). We also evaluate how FIT scales with increasing numbers of attackers .
The path reconstruction experiments are similar io map reconstruction in that a given number of attackers all send 2 packets to the tracing endhost. False negatives, as in map reconstruction, are routers that are present on one or more of the attack paths, but are not reconstructed on any of them. False positives are routers that are present in the map but are mistakenly added to the attack path. For each path reconstruction experiment, we assume that the tracing endhost has a complete map of the upstream router tree, with no false positives. From Section IV-A we see that this is reasonable, since the false positives and false negatives are very low after the tracing endhost receives many packets.
We choose three sizes of attacker populations to show how FIT scales. The attacker populations are 100, 1000, and 5000 respectively.14 In all of our experiments, we show the results €or three candidate marking schemes (expressed as 71./np,th): 4/3,4/4 and 8/5. It is important to note that the difference between the 413 and 4/4 schemes is only in the way the tracing endhost interprets packet markings; however the difference between the 4/x and 8/5 schemes is in the way routers mark the packets. Figure 7 shows the small attack scenario. In this graph we only show the false negative rate because no false positives were generated. In thts experiment, the 4/3 scheme outperforms the 4/4 and 8/5 scheme (i.e., it provides a lower false negative rate with a smaller number of packets) largely due to the limited attacker population, With few attackers, there are few routers on the attack paths, and hence, fewer fragments to be received by the tracing endhost in total. Since each fragment will collide between multiple router IP addresses, fewer fragments means fewer false positives. Figure 8 shows the effect of an increased altacker population on the false positive rate. Although the 4i3 scheme maintains its better false negative rate (at 305 packets it has roughly half the false negatives of the 414 scheme and an eighth of the 8/5 scheme), it suffers greatly in false positives. The 8/5 scheme also suffers due to the explosion of available fragments (making it easier to combine disparate fragments to falsely implicate a router), and smaller individual fragment sizes (causing more routers to be implicated per fragment). Unfortunately, attackers can use this behavior to their advantage by sending more packets and driving the curve towards higher false positives. However, the curves suggest that there is a diminishing return from such a strategy.
Finally, Figure 9 illustrates both previous points relating the number of marking fragments and their size to increased false positives. However, we see that in terms of false negatives, the 4/3 scheme still outperforms the 4/4 scheme at similar packet levels, even though its false positive rate is much higher. This result indicates that a tracing endhost can make a tradeoff between quick yet less accurate traceback (4/z where z is 1 or 2), or slower yet more accurate traceback (4/2 where z is 3 or 4). Most of the advantages originate from the one bit distance field and our new approach for map reconsuuction.
First of all, the one bit distance field frees four additional bits in the IP ID field, which we can use for a larger hash fragment, which in turn greatly decreases the number of false positives. Moreover. the one bit distance field gives FIT the abilily to detect legacy routers, which decrement the TTL and can thus be detected. Thls offers a significant advantage over AMS, which suffers from a combinatorial explosion of router choices in legacy environments (as we discuss in Section 11).
FIT also uses node marlung instead of edge marking. In node marking, a packet marking contains information about a single router, whereas in edge marking, a marking contains information about two consecutive traceback routers. Most previous traceback mechanisms use edge marking [51, Cl51, [17j. To trace back, edge marking schemes need to progressively reconstruct edge after edge starting at the victim, whereas node marking schemes can reconstruct routers at any distance as their packets arrive at the tracing host. In many cases, a single marking from a router close enough to the attacker may be sufficient to eliminate all paths except the attack path from the router map. FIT can vace back 10 or more hops on a path of length 15 after receiving only 14.3 packets, on average. The equivalent number of packets for an edge marking scheme would be on the order of thousands of packets.
Interestingly, edge marking traceback mechanisms cannot use our one bit distance field technique. In edge marking, a router needs to detect when the previous traceback router marked the packet, so that it can add its own marking to the packet. Since legacy routers decrement the TTL, and thus increment the distance, a router can not determine that it is the first router after the last marking router and thus, whether it needs to add its own marking to the packet. Another bit would be necessary for that purpose, resulting in a minimum of a two bit distance field. 
B. Advanced Reconstruction Algorithms
C. Traceroiite
FIT preserves the most critical TTL functionality of dropping packets in a routing loop. However. tools such as traceroute, which rely on deterministic decrementing of the TIZ between routers will no longer work correctly. Legacy traceroute implementations are likely to terminate early due to packet TTzs being increased by automatic marking (a packet with a TIL of 1 will be considered to have a distance of 53 unless the distance field, d, is zero). A FIT-aware version of traceroute could provide the same functionality at the cost of an increased number of packets per trace. The details of the implementation are omitted due to space constraints.
VI. CONCLUSION
Wrth the recent rise of e-crime. law enforcement and attack victims reiterate the need for a viable IP traceback mechanism. Unfortunately, current proposals for traceback mechanisms suffer from various drawbacks, including high process and storage costs, little scalability to high attacker populations and poor performance in the presence of legacy routers.
PPM schemes are particularly promising and achieved some of these properties. but they require OD the order of thousands of packets from each attacker for traceback.
We demonstrate a new approach, FIT, to improve packetmarking traceback. Our Fast Internet Traceback (FIT) protocol preserves the advantages of packet-marking traceback approaches and can perform traceback even after a very small number of attack packets with minimal processing overhead and without contacting any external entities. In addition, FIT handles legacy routers better than any previous mechanism, as a victim can even detect the presence of legacy routers on the attack path. In the optimal case, FIT can reconstruct a path even after a single attack packet.
FIT achieves these properties through a new approach for upstream router map reconstruction, a one-bit field to measure up to 32 hops to the distance to the marking router, node-based marking instead of edge-based marking, and a fast mechanism to identify the marking router.
These techniques give FIT a previously unachieved set of properties, making it one of the only viable approaches for IP traceback.
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